Opening Remarks by Allen, Ronald J.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 100




Northwestern University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Allen, Opening Remarks, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 635 (2010)
0091-4169/10/10003-0635 
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 100, No. 3 
Copyright © 2010 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A. 
635 
OPENING REMARKS 
RONALD J. ALLEN∗ 
It is a great honor to be asked to make some opening remarks at this 
centennial celebration of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
(JCLC).  On behalf of the Journal, I extend our greetings to all the 
distinguished participants and our thanks for coming.  On behalf of the 
participants, I extend our thanks and admiration to the Journal’s Editorial 
Board, which has worked tirelessly to put this interesting conference 
together.  To set the tone for the rest of the day, I was asked to give a bit of 
the history of the Journal, to highlight the important developments of the 
last century, to make predictions about the future, and to talk a little about 
one of my favorite topics, theorizing about theory—all in the remaining 
twenty-five minutes allocated for these remarks—and so I best move 
directly to the task. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JOURNAL 
In one sense, JCLC began as an outgrowth of the National Conference 
on Criminal Law and Criminology held at the school in June 1909 to 
celebrate the law school’s fiftieth anniversary.  That Conference in turn was 
a result of Roscoe Pound’s famous address presented at the annual 
convention of the American Bar Association in 1906, “The Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.”  Building upon 
his address and its impact, Pound was the primary organizer of the 1909 
Conference. The purpose of the Conference was to bring together scholars 
of both criminal law and criminology, practitioners, jurists, and public 
officials to set out a plan for criminal justice reform, and it was the first 
national conference in those fields.  The participants comprised an 
astonishing collection of talent, largely selected by the supreme courts and 
governors of the various states, and it had equally astonishing results.  
Some of the highlights include: 
•  At the close of the conference, delegates voted into existence the 
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, the first of 
its kind in the United States. 
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•  The conference led directly to the first forensics lab.  There was 
some work done in the field of police science after 1909 
conference.  This led in 1929 to the establishment of a police 
laboratory by Colonel Calvin Goddard that was affiliated with the 
Northwestern School of Law.  The next year, the American 
Journal of Police Science was created, which in 1932 became a 
section of the Journal, and the name was changed to the Journal 
of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science. 
•  The concern for practical legal education expressed during the 
1909 conference led to the creation of legal clinics in law schools. 
•  Most pertinent to today’s conference, the conference participants 
called for the creation of a journal by the American Institute of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, which would become the first 
English-language periodical “devoted to the scientific study of the 
criminal law and criminology.”  And it remained the only journal 
for a considerable period of time during which the Journal almost 
singlehandedly kept alive criminology in the United States.  It 
was not until the decade of the 1960s when federal money began 
pouring into research into “causes of crimes” and related topics 
that the field built upon the foundations created by the Institute 
and the Journal. 
Here are some interesting facts about the Journal: 
• It had the same Editor-in-Chief for fifty years, Robert H. Gault, a 
professor of psychology at Northwestern, and finally transitioned 
to a fully student-run publication in 1971 (the sixty-second 
volume).  However, the Journal retains a professional board of 
criminologists to oversee the criminology articles it publishes. 
• The Journal published its first female author in its second volume 
1911. 
• Notable authors, in addition to essentially every single productive 
scholar in the fields of criminal law and criminology, include: 
Booker T. Washington, J. Edgar Hoover, Dean Wigmore, Roscoe 
Pound, Chief Justice Warren Burger, and Robert Kennedy. 
• It likely has the record for name changes.  Originally, it was the 
Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and 
Criminology.  In 1941, it became the Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology.  In 1951, it became the Journal of Criminal 
Law, Criminology and Police Science, and in 1973 when the 
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separate section on police science was eliminated in the sixty-
fourth volume it became the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology. 
Today it has the distinction of being the only leading journal in two 
different fields, criminal law and procedure and criminology.  Even though 
it is a specialty law journal, and a complicated one because of the 
criminology section, it is consistently ranked among the most influential 
and cited law reviews in the country.  And it actually pays for itself by its 
large subscription base—second largest among all law reviews—which is 
rarity among the nation’s journals. 
II. IMPORTANT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST CENTURY 
Anything can be viewed through an infinite variety of lenses.  Some 
might think that the Model Penal Code was the most important historical 
phenomenon of the past century pertinent to the fields of criminal law and 
criminology; others would focus on the rise and fall of the rehabilitative 
ideal, and the commensurate rise and fall of both psychoanalysis and 
behaviorism, with their implications for the meaning and treatment of 
“deviancy.”  And still others might focus on the federal interest in and the 
federalizing of criminal law represented by the two great Presidential 
commissions.  The first of these was President Herbert Hoover’s 
Wickersham Commission, the popular name for the National Commission 
on Law Observance and Enforcement, which published its work in 1929.  
This commission conducted the first comprehensive national study of crime 
and law enforcement in U.S. history.  The second, of course, is The 
President’s Crime Commission, which was created by President Lyndon 
Johnson in 1965 and finished its efforts in 1967.  Still others might focus on 
the overuse of the criminal sanction in the middle of the twentieth century 
followed by the blurring of the lines between criminal and civil law through 
the use of civil sanctions and all their implications.  And others would note 
either, or both, the sumptuary nature of much American criminal law or its 
overblown and archaic nature. 
Each of the points above is critically important and a good case can be 
made for their preeminence, but I want to suggest a different perspective.  I 
think much of what defines and has animated these fields can be organized 
over two prohibitions, the rise of two political movements, and two wars (or 
three depending on how you count). 
The prohibitions were the related experiments with the legal 
suppression of alcohol and narcotics.  Everyone knows of the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1919, and not repealed until the 
Twenty-First Amendment was ratified in 1933.  Less well known is the that 
the prohibition of hemp products and opiates was beginning at just about 
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the same time and, of course, has largely continued to today.  I think lost in 
public awareness is that the secondary consequence of these prohibitions 
was to generate monopoly profits for those willing to take the risk, and this 
led directly to the rise of well-funded organized crime in the United States.  
This in turn led to the public perception of crime waves, contributed to 
political corruption, and put criminal justice on the map permanently.  
National political campaigns, beginning with the 1968 presidential 
elections, began to be organized around law and order themes, forever 
changing politics in the United States.  In one of the most perverse but 
interesting of modern developments, these issues have now gone global, 
with the real risk of nation-states becoming narco-states, all in large 
measure driven by the astonishing amount of money that feeding people’s 
illegal habits and desires can generate. 
At the same time the consequences of prohibition were playing out, 
politics underwent a second transformation in the United States.  The 
Eisenhower and post-Eisenhower years of optimism both gave rise to 
beliefs in perfectionism of various kinds and opened the door for the airing 
of grievances from both the repressed (racial minorities) and the disaffected 
(the young), all within the frame work of social toleration that did not have 
a clue as to what it had released.  This directly led to the rebirth of 
conservatism, which traces back not to Reagan but to Nixon, and the 
politicization of criminal justice mentioned above.  At the same time, the 
turmoil unleashed in the 1960s and 1970s shocked much of America, as it 
saw its children reject the very values that in their parents’ eyes had led 
them to believe in the potential of society to advance, and to believe in the 
possibility of moral progress.  How quaint that all now seems as it has 
become clear that the twentieth century is in some ways the counter-
example to the possibility of moral progress, with human slaughter on an 
almost unimaginable scale.  But that is not what people here in the United 
States were thinking then.  It was time of optimism called into question by 
the very forces unleashed by that optimism.  This in turn surely was part of 
the ground work for the Reagan revolution, which is very likely the most 
seismic political shift the country has ever seen.  Even today, the argument 
is largely over how far to the right the modal voter is in this country. 
Hovering over all of the social turmoil were two wars—the Vietnam 
War and the war on terrorism (however many wars that is—Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda).  The interaction of these phenomena is obvious.  
The Vietnam War fueled the anti-government bias of much of the youth of 
America, stimulated them to action, which in turn fueled the attack from the 
right of much of what was constructed in the ’60s, from the Great Society to 
the Procedural Revolution.  The present wars are blurring the distinctions 
between terrorism and war, and between both of those and crime.  They are 
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also blurring the distinctions between the war powers of the President and 
his role as Commander-in-Chief with his obligation to faithfully discharge 
the duties of his office and to preserve and protect the Constitution of the 
United States. 
III. THESE THINGS POINT TO THE FUTURE. 
As everyone from Niels Bohr to Yogi Berra has said, predictions are 
difficult, especially about the future.  Some of the things I think we will see 
are: 
• The continuing dismantling of the procedural revolution of the 
Warren Court, leaving in place only right to counsel in death 
penalty cases as a definitive marker of what once was.  Relatedly, 
we may have a reenergized originalist Supreme Court willing to 
generate enormous dislocations in the name of the rediscovered 
true meaning of constitutional language along the lines of 
Apprendi and Crawford. 
• Great effort will be expended by both Congress and the courts on 
defining the power of the President, the implications of war, 
indeed the very meaning of the term in an era where the 
conventional markers of an army, and thus a war, are missing—
standing armies, hierarchical command structure, and belligerent 
nation states. 
• The continuing dismantling of the social consensus of the middle 
of the last century coupled with a world in which a single terrorist 
could unleash a dirty bomb or pollute waterways, or whatever, all 
overlaid with national borders where hundreds of millions of 
people a year cross both will lead to a reconsideration of the 
implications of privacy, autonomy, and dignity.  In this regard, 
consider: 
 the ever-changing Fourth Amendment; 
 changing paradigms of policing from patrol to no-broken-
windows to neighborhood; 
 emergence of new theories of criminal law such as its 
expressive function; 
 reconsideration of the meaning of equality whether directed 
to the meaning of racial profiling (Muslims?) or how social 
demands can and should affect different segments of society; 
 the globalization of crime and enforcement will continue, 
whether it is Al-Qaeda, or the mafia, or a polluting 
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corporation; tracking the money will become the single most 
significant global crime fighting strategy; and 
 as crime goes global, and as solutions to social problems 
come to be seen more and more as requiring the active 
involvement of the central government, the federal-state 
relationship will continue to evolve away from anything 
anticipated by any of the framers of the Constitution. 
• And a predictions section would not be complete without 
something about the continuing scientification of criminal trials, 
whether as a result of enhanced DNA analysis, or what is less 
well known by surely of much greater significance, enhanced 
video surveillance that is emerging in part because of the 
continuing technological advances. 
IV. THEORIZING ABOUT THEORY 
It was kind of the Editors of the Journal to ask me to close with a few 
remarks on a research interest of mine, which relates to the limits of formal 
reasoning.  Normally, I would jump at the chance to complain about the 
vacuousness of most “normative” legal scholarship, but that is complicated 
here because the Journal is so empirically bent.  Its criminology section is 
peer-reviewed, and its selections for the criminal law section seem to me to 
be appropriately skeptical of unmoored musings passing as normative 
scholarship.  So, I fear my standard sermon would be preaching to the 
choir, and thus rather than give it, I will close with two related by more 
discrete points. 
The first point is that scholarship within the purview of the Journal has 
neglected to its detriment the bracing nature and cold precision of 
economics.  Perhaps this is because of a belief that normative scholarship 
can simply neglect such things as quantifiable cost-benefit calculations, 
utility functions, and the like, and because even excellent empirical research 
in some fields can be done without regard to them as well.  Whatever the 
cause, the consequence is regrettable.  One simply cannot argue about rights 
in the abstract; there are always costs attached and reciprocal rights 
adversely affected.  Plea bargaining is a good example.  Any distribution at 
all between trial and non-trial dispositions could be socially optimal.  Trials 
may have their unique values, but nonetheless those values compete with 
others.  Surely one of the points of criminal dispositions is to affect primary 
behavior, and how that is most efficiently done is equally surely pertinent to 
how to spend resources.  Maybe more trials would be a wonderful way to 
vindicate individual rights, but how much is that vindication worth?  Trials 
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compete for resources with other uses that also impact the most cherished 
of values.  How do the values here compete with greater funding for 
schools, roads, or medical research?  This is an example of what Larry 
Laudan and I have referred to in a series of articles as the deadly dilemma 
of governing.  Every governmental choice has life and death implications, 
not just trials—even where you build a road or how to distribute medical 
research funds—or whether to permit plea bargaining. 
The second area that has been neglected is what increasingly 
dominates many areas of science and philosophy, and that is the 
implications of complexity.  I will mention two of those implications.  First, 
things are always more complicated than they appear.  This is related to the 
point above, but let me give you another example.  It is conventional that 
proof beyond reasonable doubt skews errors in favor of acquitting the guilty 
in order to protect innocent people, but in fact there is no necessary 
relationship between a burden of persuasion and outcomes.  That 
relationship depends on base rates and assessments of probability.  If no 
innocent people go to trial, no innocent person will be convicted, and vice 
versa; if no guilty people go to trial, no guilty person will be wrongfully 
acquitted.  That means the common justification for things like proof 
beyond reasonable doubt—that it protects the innocent by sacrificing true 
convictions—makes almost literally no sense.  Suppose, for example, that 
there are nine wrongful convictions out of every one hundred.  To keep a 10 
to 1 ratio of wrongful acquittals to wrongful convictions, one needs ninety 
wrongful acquittals, leaving one correct decision.  Thus, a system with 
ninety-nine out of one hundred errors satisfies the ratio but seems quite 
perverse.  Or suppose there is a 75% conviction rate, and a 5% error rate.  
In such a case, one needs thirty-seven wrongful acquittals to offset 3.75 
wrongful convictions, but there are only twenty-five acquittals to go around 
(and all of them need to be guilty).  Thus, the ratio, literally, cannot be 
satisfied leaving the conventional explanation of the requirement of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt quite incoherent. 
My two points combine more generally as a vindication of what Oliver 
Wendell Holmes said over and over—to wit that no general theory is worth 
a damn—yet the law schools continue to pour out general theories.  (I am 
back to my general lament!)  One of the reasons they usually—indeed 
maybe universally—are not worth a damn is that the simple tools of top 
down theorizing—usually deductive in nature—are inadequate to capture 
the reality being theorized about, which is invariably dynamic.  So, we have 
the spectacle of one bad theory after another of the Fourth Amendment or 
the Fifth Amendment or whatever, where “bad” means has no discernable 
relationship to reality except to be enlightening of the normative 
commitments of the writer.  We need calculus, not just algebra, to make 
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progress, I think, whatever that might mean for research in criminal law and 
procedure and criminology. 
Whether anyone in the room besides myself thinks in such terms, and I 
know definitely that at least one or two of you who shall go nameless do 
not, I cannot imagine a better collection of individuals than we have here 
today to apply calculus to the domain of criminal justice. 
